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CURRENT DECISI6NS
of paragraph two of section 13 that the lessor furnish a general warranty
deed indicated that the parties excluded a judicial sale where only a
special warranty deed would be executed. 1 The court stated, "Since a
right of first refusal is inserted in a lease for the benefit of the lessee,
we must interpret it with that purpose in mind." 1
The position taken by the Supreme Court of Appeals appears to be
the better of the two views on the subject, since it is not based solely
on the technicalities of the specific lease as are the decisions in Draper
and Rigby's Estate. Since none of the leases or facts in the cases con-
sidered above are precisely the same, the conflict of authority may not
be as great as it first appears.'3 The decision of the Virginia high court
giving the lessee the protection he has bargained for is a just one and
should be adopted as the preferred view when other jurisdictions con-
sider this question.
Ion W. Bruce
Tort-CONTRBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-FAILURE TO ATTACH SEAT BELTS.
On July 25, 1964, the plaintiff, Singleton, a guest in an automobile driven
by defendant, Cierpisz was seriously injured when the defendant col-
lided with another automobile on a country road in Maryland. Al-
though seat belts were installed in the automobile at the time of the
accident, neither party had them fastened. Plaintiff brought an action
for damages based on defendant's negligence in operating the auto-
mobile. The trial court held for the plaintiff and the defendant ap-
pealed, noting as error the trial court's failure to submit to the jury
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence in not attaching her
seat belt.
11. Supra note 1.12. 'Cities Service Oil Company v. Estes, 208 Va. at 49; accord, First National Bank
v. Roanoke Oil Company, 169 Va. 99, 192 S.E. 764 (1937).
13. The particular facts of the instant case might cause the Texas and Wyoming
courts to reach a decision similar to that of the Supreme Court of Appeali of Virginia.
The Texas court in Draper based its opinion on the fact that the lease permitted the
right of first refusal to be used only wherever the landlord had a desire to sell. In the
present case the right of first refusal clause was exercisable in the event the Landlord
at any time during the term of the lease "received a bona fide offer satisfactory to it
for the sale of the above described premises." The heirs of O.H. Mull were satisfied
with the price the property brought at judicial and did not file a brief on appeal. The
Texas court would be hard put to find that that clause of the lease was not fulfilled.
Also, the fact that the heirs had accepted the price would destroy the foundation for
the decision in Rigby's Estate, since it could be said that the heirs had set the price
by asking for the sale and accepting the final bid.
19671
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The Maryland Court of Appeals' held it was not error to refuse to
submit the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence for fail-
ure to use the seat belt without proof that this failure caused or aggra-
vated her injuries.' The Court refused to imply from the Maryland
statute3 requiring the installation of seat belts, that it was negligence
per se to fail to fasten them.
Seat belt legislation is relatively new, the first statute being passed by
the Wisconsin Legislature in 196 1.4 Today, twenty-three states have
adopted seat belt statutes5 with the major emphasis being on installa-
tion in passenger cars.6 Among these statutes two approaches prevail
regarding the negligence of a person in failing to attach seat belts. In
three states-Minnesota, 7 Tennessee,8 and Virginia-the law specif-
ically states that failure to use seat belts is not negligence nor can such
failure be used in mitigation of personal injury or property damages.
The other twenty states have left the determination of what is negli-
gence to the courts providing no guidelines for the courts to follow.
Wisconsin, the first state to approach this problem, set the general
trend of caution, which was followed by the court in Cierpisz v. Single-
ton. In Bentzler v. Braun,10 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
1. Cierpisz v. Singleton, 230 A. 2d 629 (Md. 1967).
2. Id. at 635.
3. MD. ANN. CODE. art. 66Y2 § 296 A (1957).
(a) Every motor vehicle registered in this State and manufactured or as-
sembled after June 1, 1964, shall be equipped with two sets of seat belts
on the front seat.
(b) For the purpose of this section only 'motor vehicle' shall mean any
vehicle intended for use as a private passenger vehicle and shall not
include any motor bus, truck or taxicab.
4. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (Supp. 1967).
5. California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
6. Only two states-New York and Rhode Island-have made provisions for other
types of motor vehicles; see, CONSOL. LAWS oF N.Y. ANN., Book 62A, S 383 (Supp.
1967) and R.I GEN. LAws ANN. § 31-23-41 (Supp. 1963).
7. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 169 § 169.685(4) (Supp. 1966).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-930(3) (Supp. 1964).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.1 (b) (1950).
Failure to use such safety belts or shoulder harnesses shall not be deemed to
be negligence.
10. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W. 2d 626 (1967); accord, Busick v. Budner, No. 381-602,
Civil Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Ctny., Wis. (October 27, 1965); contra, Stockinger v. Dunisch,
No. 981, Cir. Ct. Sheboygan Cny., Wis. (October 9, 1964).
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dlthough it was not negligence per se to fail to use seat belts, neverthe-
less, "there is a duty, based on the common law standard of ordinary
care, to use available seat belts, independent of statutory mandate.
.., However, in order for the defendant to succeed in this defense
he must show not only a lack of this ordinary care, but also a causal
connection between plaintiff's actions and the injuries sustained as a
result- of these actions. 12
It is this problem of causation that has given the courts the most
difficulty, and has led to a reluctance to act affirmatively in this field.
In any collision, for example, ordinarily no one can safely say which
injuries were caused by the accident, and which were caused by the
"failiure to use seat belts. Even if it were determined that seat belts re-
duced accidents by a substantial percentage, it would be difficult to
determine if the injuries were preventable or if they would have oc-
curred regardless of the use of seat belts.la Because of this some courts
have refused to pass on this issue at all, or have tried to encourage the
legislatures to set the standards to be followed.' 4 Yet, in most instances,
the legislatures have either not proceeded far enough or have not acted
at all. '
Even if adequate standards can be determined and a true casual con-
nection can be found, the courts might still be hesitant to move into
this field. This is due to the fact that in states having no comparative
negligence statute, the slightest negligence by the plaintiff which can
11. PROSSER, ToRTS 153 (3d ed., 1964)
The standard of conduct must be an external and objective one and it must
make proper allowances for the risk apparent to the actor, for his capacity to
meet it and for the circumstances under which he must act. The applica-
tion of (this formula) must be left to the jury or court.
12. Note, Seat Belt and Contributory Negligence, 12 S.D. L. REv. 130, 134 (1967);
see, Sams v. Sams 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E. 2d 154 (1966) (The court held that the question
of negligence should be left to the determination of the jury taking into account all
the facts.); Kavanagh v. Butorac 221 N.E. 2d 824 (Ind. 1966); Mortensen v. Southern
Pacific Co. 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1967).
13. See generally, Kleist, Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HAs-nNGs L.
REv. 613 (1967); Roethe, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 288 (1967).
14. Brown v. Kendrick 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1966); Lipscomb v. Diamiani 226 A. 2d
914 (Del. 1967) (Here the Court specifically said that the standard of care should be
left to the legislature.).
15. Between 1963 and 1964 fifteen states proposed but failed to adopt seat belt
statutes: Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and
Texas. See, Note, Motor Vehicles-A Comparative Analysis of Seat Belt Legislation
14 DE PAUL L. REv. 152 (1964).
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be traced to the aggravation of his injuries, would be a bar to his re-
covery. This expansion of the defense of personal liability goes against
the trend of decreasing the use of these defenses and increasing the
basis of liability.16 To overcome this paradox in the law it has been
suggested 17 that all the states' 8 adopt a comparative negligence standard
so that any negligence by the plaintiff would be in mitigation and not
a bar to recovery. 19
Although the Maryland Court in Cierpisz did not consider this theo-
retical problem, it still found itself reluctant to act without adequate
guidelines and standards. It did not adopt the minority's philosophy
that it is not negligence to fail to wear seat belts, nor did it consider
it negligence per se in not attaching them. Instead, it followed the logic
of the majority in reserving the determination of negligence to a future
court when the questions of degree of care and causation have been
solved.
Michael A. Brodie
16. See generally, PROSSER, supra note 11, at 258; James, Imputed Negligence and
Vicarious Liability: A Study of a Paradox, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 48 (1957); Wolfstone,
Imputation of Contributory Negligence, 1 PERSONAL INJURY LLAILITy 241 (C.E.B. 1966).
17. New York Justice Manuel Levine made the following suggestion to the American
Trial Lawyer's Association meeting on July 25, 1966 in Los Angeles, California:
Where plaintiff's prior conduct is found to have played no part in bring-
ing about an impact or accident, but has aggravated the ensuing damages,
the better view is to reduce the plaintiff's recovery to the extent that his
damages have been aggravated by his own conduct.
18. This would not change the general contributory negligence doctrine as many
states today have comparative negligence provisions to cover select tort liabilities. Vir-
ginia, for example has comparative negligence with respect to railroad crossing accidents;
see, Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Pulham 185 Va. 908, 41 S.E. 2d 54 (1947); Southern R.
Co. v. Whitzel, 159 Va. 796, 167 SaE. 427 (1933); Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. White 158
Va. 243, 163 SE. 530 (1931).
19. See, Kleist, supra, note 13, at 619; contra, Vernon v. Droesti, No. 17, 1705 Dist.
Ct., Brazos Cnty., Texas (June 9, 1966) (The jury found the non-use of seat belts,
together with other factors of negligence, totally precluded the plaintiff's recovery.).
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